- Yunus’s China visit signals Bangladesh’s shift from India.
- Hasina’s fall and India’s asylum spark diplomatic tensions.
- China’s $2.1 billion investment strengthens Bangladesh-China ties.
- Yunus’s Northeast remarks provoke Indian security concerns.
- Bangladesh’s reliance on China risks alienating the West.
A Diplomatic Leap Amid Domestic Ashes
When Dr. Muhammad Yunus, the Nobel laureate steering Bangladesh’s interim government, landed in China on March 26, 2025, the move reverberated far beyond a routine state visit. Departing Dhaka on Bangladesh’s Independence Day, a date steeped in the nation’s 1971 liberation with India’s aid, Yunus chose Beijing over New Delhi for his first bilateral trip since assuming power in August 2024.
This four-day tour, culminating in a meeting with President Xi Jinping on March 28, wasn’t just a diplomatic gesture; it was a calculated pivot, born from the wreckage of Sheikh Hasina’s India-backed regime and signaling Bangladesh’s intent to reshape its place in South Asia’s volatile power grid.
The backdrop to this shift is a tale of upheaval. Hasina, who ruled for 15 years with India as her staunchest ally, was toppled by a student-led uprising dubbed the “Monsoon Revolution.” What began in July 2024 as protests against a reinstated job quota system spiraled into a nationwide rebellion against her autocratic rule. The government’s response was ruthless, over 700 deaths and 19,000 injuries in weeks of clashes, a massacre that scarred the nation and turned public sentiment irrevocably against her.
On August 5, as protesters breached her residence, Hasina fled to India in a military helicopter, leaving behind a power vacuum that Yunus, a globally revered figure for his microfinance legacy, stepped in to fill.
India’s decision to grant her asylum, despite Dhaka’s extradition demands, ignited a firestorm. “She must face justice here,” Yunus declared in September, condemning her continued critiques from Delhi as a breach of neighborly trust. This betrayal, coupled with India’s hesitance to embrace Yunus’s interim leadership, set the stage for his China gambit—a move that has experts and regional powers recalculating their strategies.
From Hainan to Beijing: A Strategic Playbook
Yunus’s itinerary was packed with purpose. He arrived in Hainan aboard a special China Southern flight, delivering a keynote at the Boao Forum for Asia on a “shared future” for the continent—a subtle nod to China’s global vision.
In Beijing, his March 28 summit with Xi yielded nine agreements, from economic cooperation to healthcare partnerships, underpinned by $2.1 billion in Chinese investments, loans, and grants. Key deals included modernizing Mongla Port, establishing a Chinese Industrial Economic Zone in Chattogram, and a solar plant by Longi, a Chinese giant. Three Yunnan hospitals were pledged for Bangladeshi patients—a direct counter to India’s post-uprising visa restrictions that have choked medical access for thousands.
But it was Yunus’s rhetoric that stole the spotlight. Pitching Bangladesh as a manufacturing hub, he urged China to “extend its economy” into South Asia, spotlighting India’s landlocked Northeast—the “Seven Sisters”—as a region ripe for Beijing’s influence via Dhaka’s maritime gateway. “They have no way to reach the ocean. We are the only guardian of this region,” Yunus told a Beijing roundtable, a statement that electrified Indian leaders and X debates alike.
To Professor Imtiaz Ahmed of Dhaka University, this was “BRI 2.0 in action—ports, jobs, and a foothold in India’s backyard.” China, quick to recognize Yunus’s government when others wavered, seized the moment, with Xi hailing him as an “old friend” and marking 50 years of Sino-Bangladeshi ties with a flourish.
The Monsoon Revolution: A Nation Reborn, a Policy Rewritten
To grasp this pivot, one must rewind to the summer of 2024. The July Movement wasn’t just a protest—it was a reckoning. Sparked by a Supreme Court ruling reinstating job quotas favoring Hasina’s loyalists, students flooded the streets, their demands swelling into a broader cry against corruption, repression, and economic stagnation.
Hasina’s response—deploying police, military, and Awami League enforcers—unleashed a bloodbath. Images of tear gas, bullet-riddled campuses, and mass arrests flooded global media, with X posts tagging #BangladeshMassacre trending worldwide. By August, the death toll topped 700, a toll that shattered her legitimacy and forced her escape as Dhaka burned.
Professor Muhammad Yunus, appointed Chief Adviser by a coalition of students, military, and civic leaders, inherited a nation in flux. His interim government’s mandate—to stabilize and reform—came with a foreign policy blank slate.
Hasina’s India-centric approach, cemented by trade deals and security pacts, had tethered Dhaka to Delhi. But her ouster, followed by India’s asylum for her and visa curbs that slashed Bangladeshi access to Indian hospitals, flipped the script. “This isn’t a rejection of India,” argues Dr. M Jashim Uddin of North South University, “but a necessity—Bangladesh needs friends beyond its western border.”
India’s Shadow: From Ally to Adversary!
India’s role in this saga is complex and increasingly fraught. For decades, Delhi propped up Hasina, viewing her as a bulwark against Islamist extremism and Chinese encroachment. However, her fall and India’s decision to shelter her shifted the dynamic overnight. Visa restrictions, seen in Dhaka as punitive, have hit Bangladeshis hard. Those who once flocked to Kolkata and Delhi for affordable healthcare now face delays or denials, creating a void that China’s Yunnan offer aims to fill.
Then came Yunus’s Northeast remark, a diplomatic grenade. By framing Bangladesh as the “guardian” of India’s landlocked Seven Sisters—Assam, Arunachal Pradesh, and five others—he invited China into a region Delhi guards jealously, linked to the mainland only by the narrow Siliguri Corridor, or “Chicken’s Neck.”
Assam Chief Minister Himanta Biswa Sarma called it “offensive and condemnable,” while Manipur’s ex-CM N Biren Singh warned of “geopolitical ambitions” threatening India’s sovereignty. On X, #SevenSisters flared with outrage, some alleging Yunus echoed separatist rhetoric.
Rishi Gupta of the Asia Society Policy Institute sees a deeper game. “This isn’t just economics; it’s a signal to India. The Teesta River project, now open to Chinese bids, and discussions about Northeast connectivity via Bangladesh have triggered security concerns in Delhi.”
India, already encircled by China’s BRI projects in Pakistan and Sri Lanka, fears that a Bangladesh tilt could tighten the noose. Perceptions of Indian propaganda, amplified by posts on X claiming that Delhi exaggerates minority attacks to discredit Yunus, have only widened the gulf. “India has overplayed its Hasina card,” Gupta adds, “and Yunus is exploiting the fallout.”
China’s Regional Chessboard: Nepal and Beyond
China’s embrace of Yunus fits a broader pattern. In Nepal, Beijing has steadily eroded India’s dominance, funding highways, hydropower projects, and rail links under the BRI umbrella. Kathmandu’s drift, evident in its 2024 trade deals favoring China, offers a blueprint for Bangladesh.
Yunus’s Northeast pitch, though bolder, mirrors this strategy, leveraging geography to pull landlocked regions into Beijing’s orbit. His nod to Nepal and Bhutan’s hydropower potential during the visit hints at a wider vision, though analysts like Mahfuz Kabir of BIISS caution, “This is economic, not a full alliance—yet.”
Beijing’s swift recognition of Yunus’s government, bypassing the hesitance of India and the West, was a masterstroke. “China doesn’t care about interim labels,” says former ambassador Munshi Faiz Ahmad. “It saw a partner and pounced.” The $2.1 billion package, while modest next to BRI billions elsewhere, buys influence in a nation of 170 million at India’s doorstep.
Risks, Rewards, and a Tightrope Walk
For Bangladesh, the rewards glitter: jobs from Chinese factories, infrastructure upgrades, and a counterweight to India’s heft. The Rohingya crisis, a regional sore spot, saw China pledge vague support for a “mutually acceptable” resolution with Myanmar—more symbol than substance, but still a diplomatic win.
Yet the risks loom large. “China’s loans aren’t charity,” warns Prof. Tawfique Haque. “Sri Lanka’s Hambantota port is a lesson Dhaka must learn to avoid.” Over-reliance could also alienate the U.S. and EU, key export markets wary of Beijing’s influence.
India’s response remains a wildcard. Modi’s Independence Day message to Yunus, invoking 1971, aimed to mend fences, but the China visit and Northeast remarks may force a harder line. Visa curbs and alleged media campaigns—decried by Bangladeshi voices on X as destabilizing propaganda—suggest that Delhi’s patience is thinning. “Yunus is on a tightrope,” Gupta observes. “He needs China’s cash but can’t burn bridges with India or the West.”
A New Bangladesh in a Shifting World
Dr. Yunus’s China tour is a defining moment—a phoenix rising from Hasina’s ashes, bold yet precarious. It’s a rebuke to India’s dominance, a handshake with Beijing’s ambition, and a declaration of Bangladesh’s agency. As South Asia’s fault lines deepen, Dhaka’s recalibration could redraw alliances or spark friction. “We’re not bystanders anymore,” Prof. Ahmed asserts, capturing the mood. But in this high-stakes dance, can Yunus lead without stumbling? The world—and the region—is watching.